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Historically, the implementation of U.S. human rights policy has been a case of “two 
steps forward, one step back.”  From its earliest days, the United States has attempted, at least to 
some degree, to include morality, the protection of individual rights, and the spread of 
democracy in foreign policy calculations.  These efforts became more prominent after World 
War II.  By the late-1980s, human rights concerns were firmly embedded in U.S. foreign policy 
rhetoric, policy-making institutions, and global actions.  Despite these long-term trends, full 
policy implementation of human rights principles was constrained over time by lack of U.S. 
power, U.S. wariness of multilateral institutions and international legal commitments, competing 
policy priorities, and the limited institutional power of U.S. human rights advocates.  The end of 
the Cold War and other contemporaneous international and domestic shifts appeared to finally 
remove these long-standing limitations.  Now, a little more than a decade later, it is clear that 
human rights considerations have shaped recent policies in many ways.  Strikingly, though, past 
limitations have persisted.  The continuing existence of these limits shows that they were never 
short-term, era specific problems, but rather deeper constraints that stem from the realities of 
global and domestic politics.  Thus, while human rights considerations have become an 
important component of policy, those expecting a dominant role for human rights in U.S. foreign 
policy will always be disappointed and may fail to appreciate the progress that does occur. 
 
HISTORIC TRENDS 
Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop stated in 1630, “we shall be as a City upon a Hill, 
the eyes of all people are upon us.”1  This early expression of American exceptionalism and 
moralism was followed by many similar statements from early American leaders.2  These views 
led some to promote “crusading interventionism” to spread liberty; others were led to advocate 
“complacent withdrawal from world affairs” to keep America free from the world’s impurities.3  
Either way, human rights ideas had some impact on early policy-makers.  Those ideas and the 
crusading internationalist viewpoint gained new prominence after World War II.  The United 
States rose to superpower status and worked with other countries and the United Nations to 
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establish new global human rights standards.4  In the 1970s, Congress and President Carter 
placed even more focus on human rights and took steps to create the legislative and institutional 
framework that still guides U.S. human rights policy today.5  In the 1980s, under President 
Reagan, significant changes in human rights policy occurred, but the underlying focus 
remained.6 
At the same time as these positive developments, full implementation of human rights 
principles was constrained by various factors.  The limitations included an early lack of power 
that restricted the U.S. ability to effect change.  Many observers in the 19th century shared the 
opinion of John Quincy Adams, who counseled the still weak country against going out to find 
dragons to slay.  This limitation was somewhat alleviated by the subsequent rise in U.S. power, 
but first the Cold War and then the Vietnam War demonstrated that the United States still did not 
have sufficient power, or will, to spread its ideas to all countries.   
A second limitation was U.S. wariness of multilateral institutions and international legal 
commitments.  For much of its early history, the country followed George Washington’s advice 
against forming long-term alliances and multilateral commitments.  After World War II, though, 
the United States responded to new global conditions by helping establish and joining many new 
institutions and treaties.  Still, the country retained some wariness of formal commitment.  For 
example, U.S. representatives played a major role in drafting the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, but promoted a document that laid out aspirations and ideals, not legally 
binding requirements.7  Subsequently, the United States remained outside of many key 
international agreements such as the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights.  In several cases, the United States also 
openly disregarded decisions by the International Court of Justice (World Court). 
Third, pursuit of human rights policies was limited by competing policy priorities.  This 
problem can be seen even early in U.S. history in debates about whether to ally with France or 
England, but it was particularly dominant during the Cold War era.  Containment of communism 
and security interests frequently outweighed human rights concerns.  When human rights 
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policies were in line with containment, for example in criticizing communist regimes, or when 
they could be pushed in less strategically important areas, they were pursued.  On the other hand, 
when anticommunist credentials and political stability were deemed necessary, the United States 
was willing to mute criticism of pro-Western dictators.   
Finally, full implementation of a human rights policy was constrained by the limited 
institutional power of governmental human rights advocates and by minimal domestic political 
support for a human rights focus.  In the U.S. foreign policy-making process, an idea, no matter 
how worthy, will not be implemented unless it has strong and savvy supporters who are able to 
push it through the various bureaucratic or congressional debates.  Weakness of human rights 
advocates was partially ameliorated by the creation of the State Department’s Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs Bureau in 1977 and the rise of non-governmental human rights 
organizations in the 1970s.  In its early years, though, the Bureau was given little respect or 
cooperation by other bureaucratic players.8  The NGOs had limited funding and policy expertise 
and often were excluded from the relatively closed foreign policy-making system of the era.   
Thus, although there is a long-standing American tradition of rhetorical support for 
human rights and several historical and institutional changes led to development of a human 
rights policy, translating ideals into practical application was difficult.  Analysts looking at any 
given period through the 1980s could point to new ways human rights were shaping policies, but 
were also left acknowledging, and often lamenting, the particular era’s constraints on full 
implementation.9   
 
NEW FOCUS IN A NEW PERIOD 
The end of the Cold War and other contemporaneous shifts appeared to finally remove all the 
long-standing limitations on U.S. human rights policy.  Many felt that the United States now 
stood alone as a hegemon and had the power to influence decisions in countries around the 
globe.  The collapse of communism also led many to agree with Francis Fukuyama’s idea that 
history had reached its end and liberal democracy had emerged triumphant.10  Therefore, the 
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United States, as the leading democracy, would just have to nudge a few recalcitrant states into 
line with the inevitable.  Global trends also appeared favorable.  Increased economic 
globalization seemed to enable the United States and other leading powers to use trade and other 
economic policies as carrots and sticks to enforce human rights.11  Also, state sovereignty 
appeared to be weakening.  The international community increasingly accepted the idea that 
powerful countries, like the United States, would lead international efforts to bring recalcitrant 
states’ policies in line with international norms. 
The United States still retained some wariness of multilateralism and was unwilling to 
accept the levels of internal monitoring and joint action seen in the polices of other global human 
rights leaders,12 but there were important shifts in U.S. attitudes beginning in the late-1980s.  
During the Cold War, U.S. officials were often hesitant to establish powerful U.N. agencies.  
They feared that the Soviet Union and its communist allies, perhaps in conjunction with newly 
independent states that might see some Western actions as reminders of colonial imposition, 
would skew U.N. debates and definitions of which rights should be protected.  Moves toward 
democracy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the developing world reduced those worries.  The end 
of the Soviet veto in the Security Council also increased the chance of U.S.-controlled 
multilateral action.  Finally, after the long Cold War, the United States was looking to shift some 
of the burden of world responsibility to its allies and multilateral institutions.   
The Cold War’s end also took away major competing policy priorities.  With the Soviet 
threat gone, the United States appeared to have new flexibility in bilateral relationships and 
overall strategic planning.  Human rights goals could rise and security considerations decline.  
Particular country-specific interests such as counternarcotics goals in Colombia, military 
cooperation in Turkey, or regional cooperation in Egypt remained to complicate policy priorities, 
but there appeared to be no global doctrine that would conflict with the pursuit of human rights. 
By the late-1980s, the policy-making position of human rights advocates had been 
strengthened by institutional growth of both governmental and non-governmental agencies.  
Also, the foreign policymaking system opened somewhat after Vietnam to allow more 
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independent activity by Congress, the press, interest groups, and the general public.  Support 
from non-governmental actors became increasingly crucial and their access to decision-makers 
increased. 
Taken together, the various changes of the late-1980s appeared to have removed the old 
limitations.  The United States was powerful, more willing to act multilaterally, free of major 
competing priorities, and had stronger human rights advocates.  Therefore, within many 
government, NGO, and academic circles, there was great optimism that a new policy era had 
emerged and human rights considerations could move forward unencumbered.13 
Before examining the extent to which human rights policies in this new era have or have 
not matched that optimism, it is important to note a couple methodological ideas.  For the 
purpose of this argument, the post-Cold War era will be defined as beginning in 1991.  The 
major policy event of that year, the Persian Gulf War, was a harbinger of policies to come, not a 
throwback to the Cold War era policies.  Therefore, the period includes the end of George H.W. 
Bush’s presidency and the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  There are 
differences among the viewpoints and rhetoric of these three presidents.  For example, the elder 
Bush pursued more ad hoc policies, while Clinton laid out a grander vision and had more 
commitment to international organizations.14  Clinton and the younger Bush have important 
differences on how to define rights and how to pursue objectives.  For definitions, Clinton 
usually drew off existing international treaties and common law, while Bush has put more focus 
on the less legally binding idea of God-given human “dignity.”  On tactics, Clinton often acted 
multilaterally, while Bush is more willing to act unilaterally.15  These differences are real, and 
reflect both ideological disputes and the very different world conditions faced by each president.  
However, if one examines the specific country policies followed by the three presidents, there is 
significant and important continuity.  Also, differences in presidential tactics are very often 
differences of degree, not kind.  The human rights literature commonly analyzes policy 
development by administration, but this paper will focus on substantive policy trends across the 
three administrations. 
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THE STEPS FORWARD 
Since the end of the Cold War, increased focus on human rights in policy-making has continued.  
The steps forward are diverse, but can be organized around four main themes: rhetorical support 
for human rights, proactive measures to spread democracy and rights, new targeted legislation, 
and new acceptance of international human rights treaties and legal authority. 
 
Rhetorical Support 
All three post-Cold War presidents have laid out an overall vision guiding policy.  All three 
visions have incorporated and strengthened the idea of pursuing human rights and democracy.  In 
justifying the Persian Gulf War, George Bush spoke of an emerging “New World Order” based 
on international norms and rights.16  Clinton, and his National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, 
looked for a vision to replace containment and spoke of “democratic enlargement” that would 
“foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible.”17  For George 
W. Bush, the guiding vision has been defeating terrorism.  As will be discussed later, this vision 
has complicated the pursuit of a human rights agenda, but Bush has also reinforced the idea that, 
in order to defeat terrorism and assure security, America must lead the fight for individual rights.  
In his 2002 State of the Union address Bush explained, “America will lead by defending liberty 
and justice… [and] will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the 
rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, 
equal justice, and religious tolerance.”18  The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America issued in September 2000 pledged to “press governments that deny human rights.”19 
Beyond these sweeping visions, the promotion of human rights has become a regular part 
of arguments used to justify many policies.  Crucially, it is now often argued that the United 
States need not choose between human rights and other interests, because defense of human 
rights aids other interests.  This view stems partly from acceptance of the academic conventional 
wisdom that no two democracies have ever fought each other.  Furthermore, many government 
officials believe that countries with good human rights records are more likely to work with the 
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United States on transnational issues like drugs and proliferation, to engage in more trade, and, in 
the words of one State Department official, to be “the best partners and only true allies for our 
nation.”20  These statements show that human rights promotion is fully entrenched as a U.S. 
policy goal. 
 
Proactive Policies  
Traditionally, human rights policies have focused on criticizing violators and punishing them 
through a variety of symbolic, economic, and legal means.  In the post-Cold War period, the 
United States has continued to implement such polices.  For example, the State Department’s 
Annual Report on Human Rights, whose influence is illustrated each year by the strenuous 
denials and counter-attacks advanced by countries singled out for criticism, has been 
strengthened.  Also, the United States has leading diplomatic efforts to punish violators in places 
such as Serbia, Haiti, Iraq, Zimbabwe, and Burma.  Importantly, though, the United States has 
increasingly adopted more proactive policies that attempt to stop abuses before they occur and 
give greater reward for human rights progress.   
One sign of this shift has been the rise of humanitarian interventions.  There are always 
multiple interests driving major military interventions, but U.S. actions in Somalia, Haiti, and 
Kosovo were driven to a large degree by human rights and humanitarian priorities.  Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia was prompted by humanitarian desires to stop the civil war and 
establish order so that food relief could reach the starving population.21  In Haiti’s case, the 
refugee issue played a major role in policy calculations, but even once much of that flow had 
been reduced, Clinton tried a number of pressures and appeared ready to fight for democracy in 
Latin America.22  Ultimately, a major invasion was headed off only by last minute negotiations 
that restored to power the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  In Kosovo, 
the United States led NATO efforts aimed at stopping Serbian abuses.23  Importantly, this 
intervention occurred against an existing government acting in its sovereign territory.  None of 
these interventions proved entirely successful, but it is striking is that they were made at all.  
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They demonstrate that the United States was willing to use force to change the internal 
governance and conditions within other countries even when security interests were minimal.  
The U.S. has also tried to change conditions through non-military means.  New focus has 
been put on the idea of building civil societies and stable government systems that will protect 
citizens’ rights.  These ideas are not entirely new and gained momentum with the creation of the 
National Endowment for Democracy during the Reagan administration, but they have reached 
new heights.  In recent years, the United States has spent over $700 million per year on programs 
to promote democracy.24  Through programs such as the Human Rights and Democracy Fund 
(HRDF), these monies go to help monitor elections, train legislatures, develop political parties, 
promote judicial reform, and support trade unions.  These and other programs will likely expand 
if Bush pursues his goal of bringing democratic reforms to the Middle East. 
The proactive policies have also included efforts to encourage reform through carrots 
rather than sticks.  In March 2002, Bush announced the creation of a new development fund, the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).  The new $5 billion per year program will distribute aid 
only to countries that are “ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic 
freedom.”25  To be eligible, countries must meet per capita income requirements.  They are then 
scored on 16 data indicators: six on governing justly, four on investing in people, and six on 
promoting economic freedom.  Countries must score above the median for their income group on 
at least half of the indicators in each area and above the median on corruption.  The hope is that 
the program will lessen corruption and waste in U.S. aid programs, give countries an incentive to 
implement economic and political reform, reward countries that are succeeding, and help 
alleviate some of the causes of human rights abuse such as poverty and excessive state control.  
The program has been slow to become fully operational.  Implementation questions also remain, 
such as whether the program is so targeted that it will exclude many of the world’s poorest, or 
conversely whether it will become so broad that it risks becoming politicized in ways that have 
hurt past programs.  Many development and human rights groups have welcomed MCA as a new 
tool to induce change.  The embrace of aid and human rights criteria by a conservative 
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Republican president has been described as having a “Nixon-goes-to-China flavor”26 and is 
another indication of how human rights goals have become important components of U.S. policy. 
 
New Targeted Legislation 
A third development of this new era has been a shift to targeted legislation.  During the Carter 
period, the focus was on broad legislative restrictions on U.S. foreign aid.  Often referred to as 
502B restrictions, the law states that no security assistance may be provided to any country that 
engages in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”27  
In practice, however, aid only rarely has been restricted.28  Neither the executive branch nor 
Congress has wanted to antagonize U.S. allies by labeling them as abusers, and even non-
governmental human rights leaders like Aryeh Neier note that 502B is “like an atom bomb; it 
may have more benefit before you actually use it.”29  In response to the step back of non-
enforcement after the step forward of passing the legislation, congressional human rights leaders 
in the post-Cold War period have advanced more targeted legislation.  In some cases, this has 
meant new restrictions on trade with or aid to specific countries such as Burma, Indonesia, or 
Colombia.  In two other significant cases, the Leahy Law and International Religious Freedom 
Act, it has meant new global restrictions on ties with specific kinds of violators. 
With an eye toward restricting U.S. aid to Colombia without having to use the all or 
nothing approach of 502B, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sponsored an amendment to the 1997 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) that prohibited U.S. counternarotics aid to 
any specific military unit that had committed a gross violation of human rights.  The following 
year, the prohibition was extended to all forms of aid to security forces paid through the 1998 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118).  Then, in 1999, similar language 
prohibiting U.S. military training of violators was added to the Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 
105-261).  These terms are often referred to as the “Leahy Law;” however, because they are 
actually appropriations riders, they must be renewed each year as part of the appropriations 
cycle.  The Leahy language brought three significant changes.  First, the law theoretically keeps 
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U.S. aid out of the hands of actors that are among the worst violators because it targets military 
units who often lead state abuse.  Second, the law promotes prosecution of violators because aid 
can be continued if the recipient country is taking action to bring the offenders to justice.  Third, 
and most crucially, it gives the United States a targeted human rights tool to supplement the 
blunt weapon of 502B.  In 1998, the law stopped the Turkish Anti-Terror Police from purchasing 
armored vehicles.  Subsequently, it has affected discussions with Indonesia, Mexico and others.  
In late-2002, the Bush administration announced that, for the first time, it was suspending aid to 
a Colombian Air Force unit accused of using helicopter-launched rockets against civilians. 
New targeted legislation has also been put in place to punish countries that violate 
religious freedom.  The International Religious Freedom Act (P.L. 105-292) was signed into law 
on October 27, 1998 after several years of work by faith-based organizations and religious 
conservatives in Congress.30  The law establishes an Office on International Religious Freedom 
within the State Department led by an Ambassador at Large.  The office monitors religious 
persecution, recommends policies to promote freedom, and compiles its own report in 
conjunction with the annual human rights reports.  The law also provides a long list of actions 
the president can take to punish violators.  More of the sanctions were mandated in original 
drafts of the legislation, but the Clinton administration pressed for flexibility in determining 
which countries should be targeted, what actions should be taken, and when the sanctions could 
be waived.  Some observers have complained that this flexibility allows the administration too 
great an ability to avoid criticizing allies.31  At a minimum, though, the law adds another layer of 
review and potential condemnation and punishment, so that violators may be induced to change 
their policies. 
 
International Treaties and Legal Authority 
A fourth post-Cold War development was increased United States participation in international 
agreements and multilateral institutions.  Since 1988, the United States has ratified four 
international human rights treaties that it had ignored for decades.  Conventions on Genocide, 
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Torture, and Racial Discrimination, along with the fundamental International Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights, were all ratified by 1994.  As will be discussed in more detail later, the 
ratifications came with some “reservations” and “understandings.”  Also, in 1998, Clinton signed 
an executive order stating that it is the policy and practice of the U.S. government “fully to 
respect and implement its obligation under international human rights treaties to which it is a 
party.”32  These ratifications and commitments simply brought the United States in line with 
much of the rest of the international community that had already ratified the agreements, but they 
were an important symbol of a new U.S. attitude as the Cold War ended. 
The early-post Cold War years also saw the United States working much more often 
through the United Nations.  The most visible sign of this new attitude was that the United States 
went to the U.N. for resolutions of support and justification for actions in the Persian Gulf, 
Somalia, and Haiti.  In each of these cases, the decision to act was really made in Washington, 
but U.N. support was seen as politically important to reinforce the idea of a new world of 
international human rights norms and cooperation.  The U.S. has also been supportive of U.N. 
actions in Cambodia and East Timor. 
U.S. efforts in the early 1990s to buttress the U.N.’s institutional capabilities on human 
rights have garnered less attention, but are also important.  Under George H.W. Bush, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights Richard Schifter pushed the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission to be more active and investigate high profile countries.33  Also, during the Cold 
War, the United States had given rhetorical support to the idea of developing a U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, but U.S. diplomats acknowledge that the idea was never given 
active support.34  Under Clinton, however, the United States made the project a priority.  In 
1993, the office of the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner was established as a full-time human 
rights watchdog. 
One final way that the United States has shown support for multilateral actions and 
international law was by supporting formation of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.35  The United States also used sanctions and other pressures to 
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encourage countries to cooperate with the tribunals.  Established in 1993 and 1994 respectively, 
these tribunals were the first international war crimes tribunals since the post-World War II 
Nuremberg trials.  Although their long-term impact remains to be seen, the tribunals have been 
important symbols of new international agreement on norms of behavior.   Additionally, they 
have established international case law and precedents, shown that even top political leaders can 
face possible prosecution and punishment, and possibly deterred future abuses by those fearing 
punishment; however, this last point is widely contested.  U.S. support for the tribunals showed 
that the United States would acknowledge and promote the legitimacy of international courts in 
certain cases.   
 
CONTINUED LIMITS ON POWER 
As the Cold War ended, the United States appeared ready to dominate the world, but the 
following decade clearly has shown that important barriers to U.S. influence still exist.  The 
overall local conditions of countries that the United States hopes to influence and the 
determination of particular leaders to act as they see fit despite international condemnation 
remain two great barriers to U.S. influence.  These factors will not change significantly no matter 
how much economic or military power the United States amasses.  Too often, optimistic 
observers, including some U.S. government officials, assume that if the United States just 
focuses its attention on a particular country, and especially if it takes active steps like sanctions 
or military intervention, years of local history will simply vanish as indigenous people see the 
light of U.S. wisdom.  For example, when the United States acted in Somalia, some officials 
initially believed that the mission could be completed in a month’s time.  When the U.S. phase of 
the mission continued instead for five months, there was real impatience and annoyance with the 
U.N. for failing to step in to assume responsibility so that U.S. troops could withdraw.  There 
was also a degree of shock and betrayal expressed in the following fall, when eighteen U.S. 
soldiers were killed by a Somali faction that did not accept the U.N.’s plans for a new Somali 
government.  Similarly for Haiti, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere, critics tend to assume that 
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anything short of total success is a sign of U.S. inattention or mistakes, not the result of 
complicated local histories that the United States can influence only at the margins. 
Cases such as Serbia, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Zimbabwe and others defined as “rogue 
states,” also show that U.S. power to influence is severely limited if leaders are determined to act 
despite international displeasure.36  One must not forget that the prime goal for many leaders is 
to maintain power no matter what actions that requires.  Also, leaders are well aware of 
international standards, so their violations come not from ignorance, but from policy calculations 
that certain steps are necessary or justified given local conditions.  When the Cold War ended, 
many assumed that, with Soviet support gone, governments would be forced to yield to U.S. 
power, but this view neglected to give proper weight to Rep. Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill’s famous 
comment that “all politics is local.” 
Furthermore, U.S. power to bring about human rights change has been limited by four 
developments in the post-Cold War era.  First, the spread of a global economy, at times, has 
constrained instead of enhanced U.S. power.37  The United States itself is increasingly dependent 
on trade and access to foreign markets and investment opportunities.  Therefore, if the United 
States threatens economic sanctions, violators can try to call the U.S. bluff, and force the United 
States into a decision that could hurt its own economy.  Also, the global economy means that 
there are many other countries ready to step in to replace lost investment, imports, and export 
markets if a country loses U.S. business.  The classic case of these economic realities is China.  
George H.W. Bush supported continued trade with China despite the government’s action at 
Tiananmen Square.  In 1993, Clinton imposed human rights conditions on China’s Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) trade status and set up a one year game of chicken.  By the spring of 1994, China 
clearly had not met the conditions, but only a minority of Congressmen and few in the 
administration were actually willing to limit U.S. trade.  This hesitation was reinforced by the 
fact that America’s European allies had long since ended their punishments of China and were 
actively looking to increase business in China should the United States pull out.  In response to 
these realities, Clinton dealt the human rights community one of its greatest losses by de-linking 
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human rights and trade and adopting a strategy of engagement with China.38  Until post-
September 11 cooperation, George W. Bush took a harder line on China’s potential to be a threat 
to the United States, but he too favored expanded trade. 
The European defection on China also highlights a second new limit on U.S. power.  
Namely, the United States can no longer automatically count on the support of its allies in 
pressing human rights concerns.  For years, international human rights alliances followed Cold 
War alliances. Democratic countries generally were in agreement and saved their toughest 
criticism for communist countries.  Furthermore, it was accepted that major disagreements within 
the alliance should be muted, so that it could remain strong against its enemies.  Recently, 
though, with the unifying Soviet threat gone, U.S. allies have shown more independence on a 
host of issues, including human rights.  As many countries move toward various forms of liberal 
and illiberal democracy, the United States and its allies are hard-pressed to agree on who 
deserves human rights pressure.  European allies have had sharp differences with the United 
States on policies toward Cuba, Iran, Iraq, China, and the Middle East.  There is also more 
difference now on tactics.  While the United States often turns to military and economic 
pressures, European governments more often address human rights through engagement, 
dialogue, and treaties.39    Europeans also have argued that the United States has followed a 
unilateralist foreign policy with little consultation.  Without allied support, the United States may 
be powerful by some measures, but it lacks both the moral authority and resources to challenge 
every violator. 
The combination of the global economy giving countries multiple sources for trade and 
the lack of allied cooperation has led many observers to conclude that a third limit on U.S. power 
is that sanctions rarely achieve their intended purpose.  Sanctions often appeal to those who are 
looking for action tougher than simple criticism.  By 2001, some form of sanctions had been 
placed on 72 countries for a variety of offenses including human rights violations.40  Numerous 
academic and other studies have shown, however, that sanctions—particularly unilateral 
sanctions as many U.S. human rights action are—have a poor record of inducing policy 
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change.41  Furthermore, they can also hurt the U.S. economy.  Business groups and coalitions 
like USA Engage frequently argue that sanctions hurt the American people.  Worse still is the 
pain that may be inflicted upon the very people the sanctions are designed to protect.  In Iraq, in 
Haiti, and elsewhere, there are real questions of whether the denial of food, medicines, safe water 
and so on may not have been worse human rights violations than anything that the indigenous 
government had done.  Human rights sanctions blossomed for the first part of this decade, but 
now both George W. Bush’s administration and congressional figures have called for their 
reduction.  Problematically, policy-makers are thus left with few options between criticism and 
intervention.  The net effect may be fewer punishments of any kind. 
A final new development limiting U.S. power to enforce human rights policies is that the 
violating countries have become much more savvy and active in combating U.S. and U.N. 
efforts.  Countries have learned that, in the human rights arena, image is very important.  Rather 
than allowing the United States and others to paint their image, countries now go on the 
offensive.  They release political prisoners at strategic times, challenge the State Department’s 
annual report almost before it has been released, and raise complaints against other countries that 
will deflect attention away from them.  Frequently criticized countries also realize that they can 
block much action if they join human rights institutions.  Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and China have all 
found that seats on the U.N. Human Rights Commission and careful lobbying of members can 
blunt many U.S. efforts.  These countries do not allow the United States to rally international 
pressure; they nip actions in the bud. 
In fact, the recent history of the U.N. Human Rights Commission is a good view into 
many of the power problems the United States faces.  Commission members are elected to 
represent their regions of the world.  Given U.S. leadership in the human rights field, the United 
States had held one of the Western Europe and Others Group seats since the commission’s 
founding.  In 2001, though, the United States came in fourth in a race for three seats.  The loss 
has been attributed by various observers to a combination of U.S. inattention to U.N. diplomacy, 
European desire to punish U.S. unilateralism, and the power of accused violators who rallied 
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voting countries against the United States and in favor of Austria, which itself had been criticized 
by international bodies.42  In 2002, the United States was able to regain its seat, but the 
commission had been much less active in the intervening year.  For example, the United States 
could not find any country willing to sponsor a tough resolution against China.  A former public 
member of the U.S. delegation attributed the reluctance to Chinese threats to economically 
punish countries that acted against China in international forums.43  
These various limits on U.S. power and policy setbacks reinforce the idea that, while 
there have been many changes in the international system in recent years, fundamentally it is still 
based on state sovereignty and pursuit of national interests.44  Although the United States stands 
as the only multi-dimensional power and is far ahead of its competitors, it cannot always dictate 
polices to either target countries or to its allies.  In principle, the United States could use its 
power to bring regime changes and engage in long-term, colonial style occupations that might or 
might not bring about desired local changes.  Such actions, however, would go against new 
global and American norms against imperialism.  Only time will tell if U.S. actions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq—both interventions driven by security goals but with important human 
rights implications—will establish a new paradigm.  Early evidence from those countries, added 
to evidence of limits on U.S. commitments to and ongoing problems in Haiti, Somalia, and the 
former Yugoslavia, seems, though, to confirm both American distaste for long-term occupations 
and nation-building and to show that local realities are the most crucial variable in determining a 
country’s path to stability and democracy.   
These limits on U.S. power suggest why U.S. human rights policies are often not 
successful, but also have affected the chance that efforts are made in the first place.  The 
American public and many government officials want to see short-term success.  If positive 
change is not guaranteed or occurs slowly, Americans often becomes frustrated or lose interest, 
and policies are scaled back.  Therefore U.S. human rights policy in the future likely will look 
much as it has in the past with the U.S. pressuring countries from the outside and often failing in 
its goals. 
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CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ACTIONS 
As was discussed earlier, the post-Cold War era has seen the United States take the forward steps 
of signing some international treaties and supporting international tribunals.  Subsequently, 
though, it has followed its usual pattern of then taking steps backward.  When the United States 
signed several treaties in the late-1980s and early 1990s, two steps were taken to limit the 
treaties’ impact.  First, each ratification was accompanied by a series of “reservations,” 
“understandings,” and “declarations” (RUDs).  These sought to clarify U.S. interpretations of 
particular treaty language and to lay out what actions the United States would or would not take 
in implementing the treaties.  Taken together, the RUDs essentially said the United States would 
follow the treaties as long as they were consistent with existing U.S. law and would implement 
the treaties without accepting any obligation to change U.S. law or policy.45  These positions 
were in line with long-held beliefs that the U.S. Constitution is the highest law in the land and 
grants Congress the exclusive power to consider and create all laws.  Thus, the validity of treaty 
guarantees that go beyond constitutional guarantees are questionable and treaties that would 
require the United States to change laws are problematic.  
RUDs are common international practice, but the U.S. RUDs raised the question of 
whether the United States was actually following the treaties at all.  In November 1994, the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission adopted a general statement on RUDs with a clear focus on the U.S. 
positions.  In that statement, the commission expressed “regret” at the U.S. positions and argued 
that specific U.S. reservations to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were “incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Covenant.”46  Since then, the United States has not ratified 
any other major human rights treaties.  Given the current focus on George W. Bush’s 
unilateralism, it is important to remember that the RUDs and slowdown in treaty signing began 
before his administration. 
The second United States move to limit the impact of the treaties brought back the idea 
of “Brickerism.”  Senator John Bricker was a fierce opponent of the United Nations, 
international legal commitments, and international human rights treaties specifically.  In the 
 18 
early-1950s, he led a movement for a constitutional amendment that would have made treaties 
non-self executing, meaning they would only become valid once Congress passed specific 
legislation implementing their terms into U.S. law.47  Bricker’s amendment would have asserted 
a large congressional role in foreign policy-making and served his express purpose: “to bury the 
so-called Convention on Human Rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever 
dare to attempt its resurrection.”48  The movement gained momentum.  To assure the measure’s 
close defeat and protect its overall constitutional powers, the Eisenhower administration 
promised that the United States would not ratify the conventions if Bricker’s amendment was 
defeated.  Future administrations moved away from that promise, but for several human rights 
conventions they returned to Bricker’s idea that the treaties should be non-self executing.  This 
requirement places an extra hurdle in the ratification process and provides a way for the United 
States to symbolically support human rights by ratification without having to accept any real 
changes in U.S. policies. 
In addition to placing limits on the treaties it has ratified, the United States also has 
chosen not to join several international treaties that relate more or less directly to human rights.  
The United States refused to join the over 100 countries that signed the 1997 Land Mines Treaty 
after U.S. demands for changes in the treaty were denied.  The United States has been slow to 
accept international efforts to stop the use of child soldiers because of its own efforts to recruit 
17 year olds into military service.49  The United States has signed, but not ratified, the 
Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.  
A desire to limit the impact of international agreements also explains U.S. reaction to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); the reaction provides a classic illustration of American 
views.  In some ways, the court is the culmination of years of U.S. effort to bring order to the 
international system and find new ways of punishing violators.  Clinton endorsed the goal of 
establishing the court in 1995, and the U.S. delegation was active in shaping the Rome Statute of 
1998 that established the court.  The ICC also seems similar to the tribunals on Yugoslavia and 
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Rwanda, which were strongly supported by the United States.  There are, however, two 
important distinctions: first, the ICC operates more independently of the U.N. security council 
and thus, in theory, more independently of great power control; second, U.S. troops or 
government officials could some day face charges by the Criminal Court.   
Over time, officials from both the Clinton and Bush administrations have expressed other 
concerns about the court.50  For example, there has been concern that the Rome Statute’s 
definitions of international crimes are vague, open-ended, and not subject to reservations.  There 
have again been questions about the constitutionality of forcing U.S. adherence to laws not 
passed by Congress.  There has also been major criticism of Article 12 of the statute, which 
states that the court may assert jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on the territory of a 
state party, including crimes committed by nationals of a non-party.  Thus, even if the United 
States does not ratify the statute, its soldiers could be brought before the ICC if they committed a 
crime while in a ratifying country.  U.S. officials have stated that this article goes against treaty 
law by making a non-party subject to a treaty.  From a practical perspective, this article only 
becomes a problem if the United States chooses not to ratify for other reasons. 
The interrelated questions of U.S. control and possible trials of Americans have been the 
two central issues hindering U.S. acceptance of the ICC.  During negotiations, the U.S. 
delegation pushed hard for U.N. Security Council control of the court, which would have 
enabled the United States to veto politically motivated investigations of U.S. citizens.  Other 
countries argued for an independent court.  In the end, the United States accepted a compromise 
that gave the ICC prosecutor much independence, but allows the Security Council to pass a 
resolution to suspend an investigation or prosecution for one year.51  Some U.S. officials still felt 
the prosecutor was given too much latitude.  Also, many argued that United States soldiers and 
officials were at greater risk of prosecution because of America’s greater world role.  Clinton 
officials thus pressed for several ways to limit the chance that Americans would be brought 
before the court.52  Most crucial was the principle of complementarity, which means that the ICC 
cannot proceed with an investigation or prosecution of a crime that is being or has been 
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investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction, unless the state is unwilling or unable 
to carry out a fair investigation or trial.53  Thus, if a U.S. soldier was accused of a crime, the case 
could go to the ICC only if the U.S. judicial system failed to genuinely investigate the allegation 
and proceed with a fair trial.  Thus, the chance of an American being but put on trial was low, 
but still present. 
Based on these concerns, the United States was one of only seven countries to vote 
against the Rome Statute.  Clinton signed the Statute on December 31, 2000, the last day that 
countries could become party to the treaty without formal ratification.  As he did so, however, he 
discussed “significant flaws in the treaty,” said he would not submit the treaty for ratification.54  
He pledged to work for evolution of court rules.  George W. Bush has expressed even deeper 
concern about the court and taken more assertive action.  First, in May 2002, as the court was 
about to begin operation, Bush notified the U.N. that the United States had no intention of 
becoming a party to the statute and was essentially “unsigning” the treaty.  Bush administration 
officials felt this unprecedented action was necessary because complementarity is “simply an 
assertion, unproven and untested.”55  They were worried about the potential damage if 
investigations of either U.S. servicemen or U.S. leaders occurred and they oppose the idea that 
the ICC ultimately decides whether a national court system has acted fairly.  The administration, 
therefore, took steps to assure that Americans would not be turned over to the ICC.  In July 2002, 
the Bush administration delayed reauthorization of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as it 
sought permanent immunity of peacekeeping troops from ICC prosecution.  U.S. actions were 
sharply criticized by European and U.N. officials.  A compromise was struck that prohibited the 
ICC from investigating peacekeepers from non-ratifying countries for one year.  A similar 
resolution was passed in 2003, but the Bush administration chose not to pursue another renewal 
in 2004 after it became clear that such a resolution would not pass.  Meanwhile, the United 
States pressed hard for countries to sign bilateral agreements under Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute.  In the agreements countries pledge not to surrender U.S. citizens to the ICC.  By the 
summer of 2004, the United States had concluded over 90 agreements, but these agreements 
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have been sharply opposed by many European countries.  In August 2002, Bush signed the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (P.L. 107-206), which prohibits U.S. military 
assistance to countries that are party to the ICC and do not sign Article 98 agreements.  The 
legislation also authorizes the president to use force to release any U.S. citizen held by the court. 
Taken all together, these actions show that the United States supports international 
treaties and courts as long as they are not applied to U.S. citizens and do not interfere with either 
U.S. domestic policies or U.S. military operations abroad.  More generally, the United States is 
once again demonstrating that it supports human rights efforts, but only when it can lead and 
control those efforts.  The U.S. position seems hypocritical to many and may prove shortsighted 
if U.S. power declines in the future.  For the foreseeable future, though, the U.S. position reflects 
international realities.  As was stated centuries ago, “The strong do what they have the power to 
do and the weak accept what they must accept.”56  Other countries may object to U.S. actions, 
but, so far at least, U.S. power has allowed it to act independently without huge long-term costs.  
Thus, as long as the United States remains the preeminent power, it will resist efforts either to 
bring its policies in line with the goals of others or to place restrictions on the pursuit of what it 
considers national interests.   
 
CONTINUED COMPETITION FROM OTHER POLICY PRIORITIES 
As a superpower, the United States has complex global interests and thus has to choose between 
policy priorities.  In the Cold War era, containment of communism trumped all other policy 
goals.  With the end of the Cold War, the United States appeared to have new flexibility.  In fact, 
the last decade has seen the emergence of two new competing priorities, namely, pursuit of 
global trade and antiterrorism. 
Clinton did raise human rights issues in his campaign against George Bush, but it was 
clear that he was elected because he remembered the famous slogan “It’s the economy, stupid.”  
Throughout his eight years, Clinton never lost focus on pursuit of a strong economy and 
embraced the idea that the United States needed access to foreign markets to continue its growth.  
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He worked hard to promote trade pacts like NAFTA and pursued ties with the “Big Emerging 
Markets.”  When pursuit of trade conflicted with tough human rights policies, as in the case of 
China, trade won time and time again.  Clinton spoke of democratic enlargement, but as Douglas 
Brinkley argues, that strategy became increasingly “econocentric” and “was about spreading 
democracy through promoting the gospel of geoconomics.”57   
Soon, human rights advocates were speaking of “The New Double Standard” under 
which action was taken against only economically unimportant countries.58  In the abstract, such 
a double standard is lamentable, but in the real world it is almost inevitable.  Trade is a growing 
part of the U.S. economy and economic strength is a growing part of what defines modern world 
power.  Human rights must not be forgotten, but those waiting for the United States to sacrifice 
its perceived economic national interests for the good of humanity will have a long wait. 
That wait has now been lengthened by George W. Bush’s declaration of war on 
terrorism.  Antiterrorism has replaced anticommunism as the guiding security doctrine.  This 
shift has shaped the allocation of administration time and resources.  It also had a crucial impact 
on U.S. alliances and willingness to criticize human rights violators.  Countries that were 
previously targeted as violators, but which expressed sympathy for U.S. losses and provided 
counterterrorism aid, were seen in a new light.  The government of Ali Abullah Salih in Yemen 
suddenly was negotiating the arrival of U.S. military trainers and equipment.  Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, known for his sharply anti-American views and support of a 
conviction against his rival Anwar Ibrahim in a case the State Department termed “politically 
motivated and patently unfair”59 was invited to the White House.  To reward Pervez Musharraf 
of Pakistan for his assistance, Bush supported new legislation that allowed him to waive 
sanctions imposed after Musharraf’s 1999 coup.  The administration also turned a relatively 
blind eye to Pakistan’s 2002 referendum that extended Musharraf’s rule without competitive 
elections and to modifications of the Pakistani constitution that gave the military a long-term role 
in politics. 
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The war on terrorism also lessened U.S. criticism of countries cracking down on internal 
groups, if those groups were defined as terrorists.  For example, criticism of Russia’s actions in 
Chechnya has declined.  Before 9/11, State Department officials met with the foreign minister of 
the separatist Chechen leadership.  After 9/11, a message was sent to separatists in Chechnya 
demanding that they sever all contacts with terrorists or face American isolation.  Bush and other 
officials subsequently have expressed sympathy for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
characterization of the Chechens as Islamic terrorists.60  The long-term civil war in Colombia 
also has been recast as a battle against terrorism since the leftist Revolutionary Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) frequently engaged in kidnappings and bombings.  In the Middle East, the 
focus has been on cracking terrorist cells, so the administration has not yet pushed hard for 
democratic reforms in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. 
The war on terrorism has also strained U.S. adherence to international treaties on the 
treatment of prisoners.  In general, the Bush administration has felt security concerns were 
paramount.  Therefore, the administration planned to hold suspected terrorists indefinitely and 
authorized use of tough interrogation tactics to acquire intelligence that might prevent future 
attacks.  In the fall of 2001, top administration officials repeatedly referred to Taliban and Al 
Qaeda detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as “unlawful combatants” and argued that they 
did not qualify as POWs under the Geneva Conventions.  President Bush reportedly confirmed 
this position on January 18, 2002 in an unreleased legal decision.61  On February 7, 2002, Bush 
partially reversed his policy after pressure from allies, human rights groups, and his own State 
Department.  He decided that, while Al Qaeda detainees still would not be covered, the 
Conventions would be applied to Taliban captives, although none of them would be granted 
POW status.62  Critics suggested that Bush was misapplying definitions in the conventions and 
that, at a minimum, the administration was required to follow Article 5 of the third Convention 
that requires a competent tribunal to determine the status of detainees whenever doubt arises as 
to their status.63  The administration argued that Article 5 tribunals were not necessary because 
there was no doubt about the detainees’ status. 
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Treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere has also drawn criticism.  In 
the wake of abuse cases at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, attention has focused on a August 2002 
Justice Department memo written to guide CIA treatment of al Qaeda detainees and a March 
2003 Defense Department report that covered actions at Guantanamo.  The Justice Department 
memo laid out a narrow definition of torture and advised the White House that torture “may be 
justified” and legal as part of the President’s efforts “to prevent further attacks on the United 
States by the Al Qaeda terrorist network.”64  The Pentagon report was based partly on the Justice 
memo and went beyond standard military doctrine in laying out acceptable interrogation 
techniques such as adjusting the temperature to uncomfortable levels, serving cold rations, and 
reversing sleep cycles from night to day.65  The White House disavowed the Justice memo and 
took the unusual step of releasing previously classified documents in an effort to show that Bush 
never approved torture.  However, the overall tough policy on detainees joins the post-9/11 
alliances and support for global crackdowns in reinforcing the idea that security interests, like 
economic interests, still trump human rights concerns and will as long as the United States 
continues to face security threats.  A situation that will continue for the foreseeable future. 
 
CONTINUED WEAKNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES 
Human rights seemed well positioned at the start of the post-Cold War era from the standpoint of 
bureaucratic and NGO power.  The State Department’s Bureau on Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor was now institutionalized.66  Offices focusing on human rights or the promotion of 
democracy were being established at the National Security Council, Agency for International 
Development, the Pentagon and in the economic agencies.  Furthermore, particularly during the 
Clinton administration, key positions were filled with long-time human rights advocates.  
Clinton’s Secretary of State Warren Christopher had been active on the issue during the Carter 
administration.  Assistant Secretaries of State for Human Rights John Shattuck and after him 
Harold Hongju Koh both were well-known and well-respected human rights advocates.  These 
leaders and many of the staff they brought with them had close connections to private human 
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rights groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. They established much 
closer working relationships between government and non-government actors.  Additionally, the 
non-government actors were themselves much better funded, staffed, and respected than they had 
been in the 1970s.  It is, therefore, noteworthy that a mere decade later, human rights advocates 
appear to have become disorganized and weak, and have lost some popular support. 
Ironically, part of the movement’s new disorganization stems from the fact that the world 
has changed in directions that the advocates favored.  The global spread of democracy, fall of 
particular dictators, and systemic changes in countries like South Africa have lessened abuse, but 
also taken away the movement’s easy targets.  Russia and China continue to face criticism on 
some issues, but are not the totalitarian dictatorships of the past.  Sustaining criticism of and 
rallying indignation against countries that still have some undesirable traits but are moving 
toward democracy has proven difficult.  Different groups inside and outside of government have 
therefore taken opposite positions on which countries should be praised for progress or criticized 
for slowness.  Advocates have also disagreed on which tactics should be employed.  For 
example, during the China MFN debates, business groups maintained a consistent voice for one 
policy.  Within the human rights community, however, some supported engagement while others 
favored punishment.  Thus, there was less strong policy advocacy overall.  With so few issues 
unifying the entire governmental and non-governmental community, supporters of action on a 
particular country or issue are often isolated voices that are easily overwhelmed by supporters of 
other concerns. 
Human rights concerns also suffer from the continued institutional weakness of their 
chief governmental supporters.  State’s human rights bureau has come a long way from its early 
days, but is still viewed warily by other bureaucrats.67  Many feel that the Bureau simply repeats 
a mantra of human rights points without considering overall policy calculations or changing 
conditions.  Even when they meet with Human Rights Bureau officials, other officials often tune 
out the message.  Also, many see the Bureau as a mouthpiece for non-governmental groups 
rather than a source for independent analysis.  Therefore, the recent access many human rights 
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advocates have enjoyed may actually have hurt their cause by reinforcing the view that they have 
“captured” the Bureau.  The Bureau’s overall position is illustrated by looking at its most 
significant work, the annual reports.  These reports have become institutionalized, and likely will 
continue for years.  They also have been given more respect over time.  Still, though, there often 
appears to be little connection between the Bureau’s reports and overall policy.  Countries are 
sharply criticized, yet aid is not cut off under 502B or other legislation, trade is continued, and 
diplomatic relations with violators continue after adjusting for their annual bump in the road.  In 
addition to the Bureau, there are other governmental actors that support human rights, but those 
in Congress and other executive branch agencies typically push pet projects and particular 
concerns, not overall policy development.68 
Given the weakness of governmental actors, human rights policy depends 
disproportionately on pressure from interest groups and the public.  Human rights groups first 
began to blossom in opposition to President Nixon’s policy of realpolitik.  They gained 
momentum during Carter’s presidency, and then came to real prominence during the Reagan era 
when they often sharply disagreed with the administration about particular cases and the overall 
direction of U.S. policy.  In some ways, the Reagan years were difficult, but many human rights 
leaders agree that the groups ultimately benefited from Reagan’s opposition.69  During that era, 
human rights debates centered on disputes over the facts of who was a human rights abuser.  The 
groups became increasing professional at gathering and disseminating these facts.  Also, during 
that era, the groups stood out as champions for morality and thus garnered much attention and 
financial support from those opposed to Reagan’s policies.  In the post-Cold War era, as the 
administrations themselves put more focus on human rights, the disputes switched away from 
facts toward difficult policy choices of how to respond to abuse.  Also, the groups were no 
longer criticizing their ideological enemies, but instead former colleagues who had entered 
government service.  The groups had better access, but that often did not always translate into 
real policy influence.  Additionally, when some government action was taken, the groups were 
left with a tough decision of whether to celebrate a glass half full, or complain about a glass half 
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empty.  Human rights groups also face new challenges because their major strategy of releasing 
dramatic reports in the hopes of embarrassing countries into better behavior has lost some of its 
power over time.  The first dramatic report might pressure a country, but years of reports lead 
many rogue states and others to learn to live with the criticism.  Meanwhile, the reports suffer 
domestically from the problem of “compassion fatigue,” a sense that a new problem emerges 
every time an old one gets settled.  Human rights groups are now respected parts of the 
Washington community, but, unless they find new tactics or new problems to focus on, they are 
unlikely to jumpstart government policies. 
Furthermore, human rights issues have not stimulated major grassroots movements, 
except in unusual cases like South African apartheid.  In polls that ask respondents to rate 
“promoting and defending human rights in other countries” as a policy goal, significantly fewer 
than half rate it as “very important.”70  Similar results are found for the goal of bringing 
democracy to other countries.  Notably, these polls numbers have been dropping in the post-Cold 
War era.   
One major problem for both governmental and non-governmental human rights 
advocates is the continued U.S. focus on security and economic interests, which makes their 
views seem of secondary importance.  As noted earlier, these other interests are unlikely to 
recede any time soon, so advocates will continue to fight an uphill battle.  A second problem is 
that few Americans see human rights abuses abroad as directly affecting their personal interests.  
Americans may support principles of morality, but evidence of human rights abuse can often be 
ignored simply by turning off the television.  On the other hand, tax increases to increase foreign 
aid, embargoes that risk American jobs, or long-term military interventions do directly impact 
average citizens.  Politicians know that they are unlikely to lose an election by disappointing the 
human rights community, but they could lose one if the side-effects of policies hurt their 
constituents.  Lack of public focus and support for tough reinforces the institutional weakness of 
governmental and NGO human rights advocates.  Thus, while human rights groups are now 
respected parts of the Washington community and have better access to policy-makers, their 
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policy influence will likely remain low for years to come unless they find new tactics or new 
problems to focus on. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the post-Cold War period has seen important new U.S. human rights actions both 
bilaterally and multilaterally.  Few observers would dispute that a sharply different policy-
making environment exists now to that of thirty, or even a dozen, years ago.  Still, major 
structural constraints remain.  U.S. power and ability to force change on others is still limited.  
The United States remains wary of international law and multilateral initiatives that can be 
applied to U.S. domestic policies or constrain foreign actions.  Competing national interests, 
particularly economic growth and antiterrorism, continue to trump human rights concerns.  
Domestically, supporters of human rights are still weak actors in the policy-making process.  In 
previous eras, observers often argued a more effective and consistent human rights policy would 
come if a few variables were altered.  The continued existence of key limits in the very different 
post-Cold War era shows that, in fact, the limits were never short-term, time or issue specific 
problems, but rather deeper constraints that stem from the realities of global and domestic 
politics.  They did not disappear with the end of the Cold War and they do not vary significantly  
by administration. 
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